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IN THE SERVICE OF SECRETS: THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT REVISITS TOTTEN
DOUGLAS KASH* AND MATTHEW INDRISANO**

I.

FINANCIAL REMUNERATION FOR CLANDESTINE SPY ACTIVITIES

Recently, the United States Supreme Court ruled that U.S.
espionage agents could not bring a civil action against the United
States seeking financial remuneration for their clandestine
activities.' Although this notion has been around since the days
immediately following the Civil War, contemporaries of a Union
spy thought the U.S. government would reconsider its 130 year
history of keeping its clandestine activities out of the courtroom.
Ultimately, the Court rendered a succinct opinion dismissing most
of the arguments set forth by both sides and relying heavily on its
decision from six score and ten years ago.
A. The Case of the Civil War Spy
In July 1861, during the opening months of the Civil War,
President Abraham Lincoln entered into a service contract with
William Lloyd.2 Specifically, Lloyd was to determine the number
of Confederate troops at different points throughout the South,
obtain plans for forts and fortifications, and obtain any other
information beneficial to the North.' President Lincoln offered
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1. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005).
2. Totten Adm'r v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876).
3. Id.
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Lloyd $200 per month for his services, and Lloyd accepted.4 It was
understood, either implicitly or explicitly, that the collection of
information was a clandestine exercise, as was the communication
of the information to the President.' Once the War and his service
behind Southern lines ended, Lloyd sought compensation for his
actions which previously had been limited to his expenses.6
After Mr. Lloyd's demise, his estate, led by his heir, Encoh
Totten, brought an action in the U.S. Court of Claims.7 The Court
dismissed the case, ruling that the President of the United States
could not contractually bind the country for secret services.' On
appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the opinion but dismissed the
Court of Claims' reasoning, noting that the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, is "undoubtedly authorized" to employ secret
agents and enter into contracts to compensate such agents which
are thereby binding upon the government.9 The Court focused on
the nature of the contract for which the parties "must have
understood that the lips of the other were to be for ever [sic] sealed
respecting the relation of either to the matter."' ° To act otherwise,
by, for example, enabling a secret agent to expose such a contract,
would be detrimental to the public and would, in fact, be itself a
breach of the contract.1' The Court tried to preclude any similar
future actions, opining that public policy forbids the maintenance
of such contractual actions, as they, by their very nature,
inevitably would lead to the disclosure of confidential matters.1'
The Totten decision eventually was expanded to all contracts
"with the government when, at the time of its creation, the
contract was secret or covert." 3 In Guong v. United States, a
Vietnamese saboteur contracted his services with the CIA as part
of OPLAN 34A. 4 In 1964, Guong was captured and held prisoner
until his escape in 1980.'5 The United States had stopped

4. Id. at 106.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. The Court's name was later changed to the United States Claims Court
and subsequently renamed United States Court of Federal Claims. See The
Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 902, 106
Stat. 4506, 4516 (1992).
8. Totten Adm'r, 92 U.S. at 106.

9.
10.
11.
12.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 106-07.
Id. at 107.

13. Guong v. U.S., 860 F.2d 1063, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1023 (1989).
14. Maj. Kelly P. Wheaton, Spycraft and Government Contracts:A Defense
of Totten v. United States, 1997 ARMY LAW. 9, 12 ((1997)). OPLAN 34A was

designed to establish long-term informant networks, and conduct intelligence
gathering and sabotage in North Vietnam.
15. Guong, 860 F.2d at 1064.
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compensation to Guong's wife by March 1965.16 Once in the
United States, Guong sued the government for $449,201.45, which
he claimed was due for his services. 7 The Court of Claims and the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed the action on
Totten grounds. 8 The Court of Claims held that "[s]ince the alleged
contract required the performance of covert military operations,
we hold that it is a contract for 'secret services' which may not be
judicially enforced."19 Guong's tripartite argument to the Court of
Appeals was that he engaged in sabotage, not espionage;
disclosure of the contract would no longer compromise government
secrets; and accounts of his operations already had been
published.20 The Court of Appeals relied on Totten, opining that
the very existence of the contract cannot be disclosed. 1 The Court
also noted that, as Totten was decided ten years after the Civil
War ended, any secrets obtained by Lloyd no longer were secret."
With respect to publication, the Court noted that such disclosure is
a matter for First Amendment cases and does not amend the
Totten precedent."
B. The Case of the Cold War Spy
The Totten line of reasoning has not stopped further lawsuits
on similar grounds. The most recent ruling was precipitated by a
lawsuit filed by a husband and wife who were diplomats from an
unnamed Eastern European country which had been an enemy of
the United States. Despite their pleas to immigrate into the
United States, agents of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
convinced them to remain at their posts and engage in espionage
on behalf of the United States. Once the couple completed their
clandestine activities, they were designated by the CIA as "PL110" aliens.'"
Although this provision enables an alien's
immigration, confirmation of U.S. citizenship, and the
establishment of a false background, it neither mandates nor
stipulates any financial guarantees.

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1065-67.
19. Id. at 1065-66.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1065.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 1065-66 (citing Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980)
(per curiam)).
24, PL-110 refers to 50 U.S.C. § 403h which admits aliens and members of
their families into the U.S. notwithstanding their immigration status. This
determination is made by the CIA Director, the Attorney General, and the
Immigration Director contingent upon the finding that admission "is in the
interest of national security or essential to the furtherance of the national
intelligence mission." Id.
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Once in the United States, the CIA assisted John Doe in
securing employment in the financial and banking industry and
apportioned a supplemental monetary stipend commensurate with
his salary. Consequently, as his salary increased, the stipend
decreased. In 1997, several years after the CIA stipend ceased,
John Doe was laid off because of a corporate merger. Due to CIAimposed restrictions regarding the type of employment John Doe
could seek, the Does' contacted the CIA in an effort to seek a
resumption of financial assistance. The CIA declined their request
which left the Does with two equally unappealing choices: return
to their former country under the threat of retribution, or remain
in the U.S. with limited opportunities for employment. In the
timeless American tradition, available to even our newest citizens,
the Does decided to bring a civil action. The couple, captioned as
John and Jane Doe, argued in their complaint that they were
promised travel arrangements, and financial and personal security
for their lives, in return for their activities.
Believing the CIA should resume payment of the monetary
stipend which they previously received for their acts of espionage,
the Does brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington seeking injunctive and mandamus relief.
In an effort to circumvent the apparent jurisdictional bar to suits
arising out of secret contracts between the government and its
spies established by the Supreme Court in the Totten decision, the
Does did not argue that the CIA was obligated under traditional
contract theory to assist the Does in sustaining their surreptitious
characters and reinstating their monetary stipend. Instead, the
Does colored their claims creatively, arguing that the ultimate
denial of their appeal to reinstate their benefits amounted to a
violation of their constitutional due process rights.
The CIA responded by filing a motion to dismiss the Does'
claims, challenging the jurisdiction of the District Court based on
the Supreme Court's decision in Totten.25 The CIA argued,
unsuccessfully, that the Does' constitutional claims were the result
of a "dispute over an alleged contract for secret services."26 In
rejecting the CIA's contention, the District Court concluded that
the jurisdictional issue did not hinge on whether an enforceable
contract existed but whether the actions of the CIA violated the
Does' constitutional due process rights." The District Court stated
that "colorable constitutional claim[s]" were not automatically
precluded from review by Totten.28
In defending its decision to deny the CIA's motion to dismiss,
the District Court concluded that the Does' due process claims
25. Doe v. Tenet, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1289 (W.D.WA 2000).
26. Id. at 1289.

27. Id.
28. Id. at 1290.
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were independent of the contractual issue which the CIA argued
was the crux of the Does' suit.29 The District Court concluded that
it could retain jurisdiction over the constitutional claims raised by
the Does and also gave short shift to the implications this suit
would have on national security interests.0 The District Court
held that most aspects of the Does' case would not infringe on
issues of national security and claimed that the trial court was
capable of relying on established court procedures to protect any
possible classified information from being revealed.3' Instead, the
District Court focused on the whether the Does had raised triable
procedural and substantive due process claims.32
The CIA immediately appealed the District Court's conclusion
that it retained jurisdiction over the Does' claims to the United
States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In determining whether
the District Court properly asserted jurisdiction over the
constitutional issues raised by the Does, the Ninth Circuit began
its opinion by focusing on whether the Tucker Act' served as a
jurisdictional bar to the Does' claims, rather than an analysis of
the Totten decision.' While the Ninth Circuit concluded that a
portion of the claims brought by the Does were barred by the
Tucker Act because of the contractual nature of their claims, the
court upheld the lower court's conclusion that it retained
jurisdiction over those claims which did not stem from the Does'
contractual relationship with the CIA. In fact, the Ninth Circuit
found "no error" in the District Court's determination that the
Does had a liberty interest in preserving their fictitious identities
and monetary stipend which the CIA could not dismiss without
amounting to a violation of the Does' constitutional due process
right.35

29. Id. at 1289-90:
[Regardless of whether plaintiffs had a contractual entitlement to
benefits (which Totten might foreclose the Court from recognizing) or a
right to benefits arising out of promissory estoppel, equitable estoppel,
or a statutory or regulatory right, once the [CIA] represented to
plaintiffs that a process existed through which they could "appeal" the
denial of their monetary stipend, defendants assumed an obligation to
provide procedural due process to [the Does'].
30. Id. at 1290.
31. Id. These court procedures include the CIA's ability to "request leave to
submit materials in this matter under seal or in camera, or ... assert the state

secrets privilege.... ." (citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8
(1953))(emphasis in original)).

32. Id. at 1291-93.
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)(2000).
34. Doe v. Tenet, 329 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that the
Tucker Act "grants the Court of Federal Claims exclusive jurisdiction over any
claim against the United States in excess of $10,000 that is 'founded ... upon
any express or implied contract with the United States' 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).

35. Id. at 1143.
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Additionally, the Ninth Circuit supported the District Court's
notion that by refusing to reinstate the Does' stipend or assist Mr.
Doe in retaining new employment, the CIA left the Does with no
alternative but to return to Eastern Europe and face the
possibility of retribution for their acts of espionage. Consequently,
regardless of whether the Does and the CIA ever entered into a
secret contract, the Does retained a liberty interest in the stipend
and fictitious identities created by the CIA which could not be
repudiated without due process.36
In affirming the jurisdiction of the District Court to hear the
Does' procedural due process claims, the Ninth Circuit once more
relied on the limitations presented by the Tucker Act. Again, the
Ninth Circuit limited the District Court's jurisdiction over the
Does' procedural due process claims to only those claims that
37
result from the secret contract between the Does and the CIA.
After considering the jurisdictional questions with regard to the
Tucker Act, the Ninth Circuit considered to what extent the Totten
decision infringed upon the Court's jurisdiction.
The Ninth Circuit could not have been more candid with its
opinion regarding whether the Totten decision barred review of the
Does' claims. The Ninth Circuit simply "d[id] not agree" that the
Totten decision was applicable to the Does' case.'
Instead, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the jurisdictional bar established in
the Totten decision only applied to those claims which "arise out of
implied or express contract[s]. "" Moreover, the Ninth Circuit did
not interpret the Totten decision as a jurisdictional bar but rather
depicted Totten as the underpinning of the state secrets privilege,
which precludes the exposure of information that would negatively
impact national security." Since the state secrets privilege would
not serve as a jurisdictional bar to the Does' claims, the Ninth
Circuit surmised that in order for the Does' claims to be
justiciable, the courts must consider whether surrendering the
Does' constitutional due process claims outweighed the possible
disclosure of national security interests.4'
Indispensable to the Ninth Circuit's decision was the
presumption that the Totten decision was not a "blanket
prohibition on suits arising out of acts of espionage, [but] is
instead simply a holding concerning contract law."42 This view
36. Id. "The district court held that the Does had raised a triable issue of
fact with regard to this claim based on a liberty interest .... " "[We find no

error in the district court's ruling denying summary judgment and permitting
these claims to go forward." Id.
37. Id. at 1144.
38. Id. at 1145.
39. Id. at 1146.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1147.
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allowed the Ninth Circuit to conclude that Totten did not apply to
the Does' case providing that their due process claims were
independent of their alleged secret contract with the CIA. Once
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Does' claims raised
justiciable due process claims, the Court turned its attention to the
public policy arguments raised in Totten and relied upon by the
CIA in the Does' case.43
In Totten, the Supreme Court relied heavily on a public policy
argument to conclude that there was a jurisdictional bar to claims
resulting from secret contacts such as the Does'. The Supreme
Court held "that public policy forbids the maintenance of any suit
in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the
disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential,
and respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be
violated." However, instead of applying the public policy line of
reasoning as a jurisdictional bar, as the Supreme Court did in
Totten, the Ninth Circuit in its analysis of the Does' case,
continued to interpret the public policy line of reasoning
articulated in Totten as the precursor to the state secrets
doctrine."
In an attempt to firmly ensconce its opinion that the Does'
case was justiciable, the Ninth Circuit went on to "provide some
guidance" for the lower court, should the CIA attempt to invoke
the state secrets doctrine on remand.' The Ninth Circuit relied
upon the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Reynolds, "7
to answer the question of whether the Does' case actually would
place national security interests in jeopardy.
In Reynolds, the Supreme Court grappled with the extent of
the government's ability to disregard discovery requests for
evidence that could expose national security interests."
The
plaintiffs in Reynolds were not spies, but widows of civilian
observers who died when the plane they were flying crashed
during the testing of electronic equipment.4 9 The plaintiffs sued
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and following their discovery
motion for the production of the official military accident
investigation reports, the Government claimed that, under the
state secrets privilege, it could refuse to produce the reports.5°

43. Id. at 1149.
44. Totten, 92 U.S. at 107.
45. Id. Doe v. Tenet, 329 F.3d at 1149-50. "This public policy principle has
flowered into the state secrets doctrine of today."
46. Tenet, 329 F.3d at 1152.
47. 345 U.S. 1 (1952).
48. Id. at 3-4.
49. Id. at 2-3.
50. Id. at 2-5.
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The Supreme Court concluded that in order to withhold
evidence based upon the state secrets privilege, a "formal claim of
privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control
over the matter" must first be filed. 5 Following the official claim
of privilege by the government, a judicial evaluation must occur to5
ensure that "the circumstances are appropriate for the claim."
The Court found that in Reynolds the Government had properly
invoked its privilege when the Secretary of the Air Force filed a
formal claim of privilege.3
While the Court recognized that
"Uludicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated
to the caprice of executive officers," the Court also stated that "we
will not go so far as to say that the court may automatically
require a complete disclosure to the judge before the claim of
privilege will be accepted in any case."' In the Reynolds opinion,
the Court remanded the case, advising that sufficient evidence
existed exclusive of the privileged accident report to prove the
plaintiffs case."
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Reynolds, the
Ninth Circuit interpreted the state secrets privilege in the Does'
case as an "absolute privilege" which "cannot be overcome by a
showing of necessity."" However, irrespective of the "absolute"
nature of the state secrets privilege, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the Reynolds opinion required a court to consider whether
sufficient safeguards exist which a court could use to protect the
discovery of information which may divulge national security
secrets and thereby allow a suit to continue." In the Ninth
Circuit's opinion, should the trial court determine that sufficient
safeguards exist to protect the disclosure of information that might
negatively affect national security interests, the state secrets
privilege would not prevent the case from continuing.'

51. Id. at 7-8.
52. Id. at 8.
53. Id. at 6-7.
54. Id. at 9-10.
55. Id. at 11-12.
56. Tenet, 329 F.3d at 1152.
57. Id. "The standard practice when evaluating claims that the state
secrets privilege applies is to conduct in camera and ex parte review of
documents. In addition, unprivileged material can and must be separated
from privileged material." Id. (citations omitted).
58. Id. at 1151.
If we are to inflict upon individuals otherwise protected by our laws,
particularly the United States Constitution, the harsh remedy of
dismissal to protect the rest of us, we must do so only after the
individual responsible for the national security interest at stake
personally reviews the matter, and only after he or she concludes and
certifies that there is indeed a national security basis for refusing to
allow any form of court consideration of the facts necessary to adjudicate
the dispute.
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Consequently, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Does' case
could proceed, since sufficient safeguards could be implemented by
the trial court to protect any national security interests that might
be raised during the course of the case.
However, the critical distinction between the Reynolds
decision and the Does' case, which the majority's opinion failed to
take into consideration, was underscored by Circuit Judge
Tallman's dissent. Judge Tallman emphasized that, "the state
secrets privilege in Reynolds permits the government to withhold
otherwise relevant discovery from a recognized cause of action
(e.g., an FTCA case), while the Totten doctrine permits the
dismissal of a lawsuit because it is non-justiciable before such
evidentiary questions are ever reached."59 Consequently, the
majority opinion failed to view Totten as an obligatory
jurisdictional bar, concluding that "Totten permits dismissal of
cases in which it is asserted that the very subject matter is a state
secret only after complying with the formalities and court
investigation requirements that have developed since Totten
within the framework of the state secrets doctrine." ° As a result,
the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Totten was only applicable to the
Does' case vis-A-vis the state secrets doctrine, and in the Ninth
Circuit's opinion, without the CIA properly invoking the state
secrets doctrine, the district court retained jurisdiction over the
Does' case.6" Determined to protect Totten and its progeny, the CIA
filed for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court.
C. The Battle of the Briefs
Courts have consistently recognized the Executive Branch as
the final arbiter when issues regarding the protection of national
security secrets arise.62 The President (as the top Executive
Branch official and Commander-in-Chief) and his designees in the
clandestine services are the ones with the expertise charged with
protecting and controlling access to classified material.' In Haig v.
Agee, the Court noted "the generally accepted view that foreign
policy was the province and responsibility of the Executive."6

Id.
59. Id. at 1158. (Tallman, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 1150 (emphasis omitted).
61. Id. at 1152."The [CIA] has not complied here with the formalities
essential to invocation of the state secrets privilege. That is reason enough to
affirm the district court's refusal to dismiss this case." Id.
62. See generally, Daniel L. Pines, The Continuing Viability of the 1875
Supreme Court Case of Totten v. United States, 53 ADMIN L. REV. 1273 (2001)
(citing numerous instances in which the Executive branch dictates matters of
national security).
63. Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988).
64. 453 U.S. 280, 293-94 (1981).
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Other courts have highlighted that Article II duties are afforded
the "utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities."'
In its brief to the U.S. Supreme Court, the CIA presented the
issue of whether the federal court can consider a due process and
tort claim involving an alleged promise for espionage services.'
The CIA argued that if a former spy sued the government, the case
inevitably would lead to the disclosure of the existence of a secret
agreement and judicial adjudication would interfere severely with
the Executive Branch's constitutional role of conducting espionage
and safeguarding information.
Consequently, Totten provided a
categorical and jurisdictional bar to such suits as a matter of
national security and foreign affairs.'
The petitioners also averred that the Ninth Circuit was wrong
when it held that the states secrets privilege set forth in Reynolds
superceded Totten's bar.
Considering Totten held that such
actions should be dismissed without ever reaching the question of
evidence,69 the Ninth Circuit opinion was wrong. The sources and
methods of intelligence and espionage are essential in all
intelligence operations and therefore must be kept secret if such
operations are to continue.7 °
The petitioners also challenged the issue regarding due
process violations. The bar to public exposure exists so long as
national security secrets are involved.
"[A]n action may be
dismissed, even if constitutional claims are involved, when a
plaintiff cannot establish his case without the use of such [state
secret] information."71 In its brief to the Supreme Court, the CIA
also argued that an action in which a spy could "prove the
existence and the details of an espionage relationship with the CIA
would be an inappropriate intrusion into the Executive Branch's
discretion to recruit, maintain, compensate, and terminate
spies . . . ."' Consequently, it appears that where national security
information is involved, courts will remain subservient to the
mandates of the Executive Branch. The determination of who has
access to such information remains the domain of those charged
with protecting it.
The Does claimed in their appeal that they were seeking a
"procedurally fair internal agency hearing for their claims for
assistance and personal security," and a declarative concession by
65. U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
66. Brief for the Petitioners at 1, Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005)(No. 03-

1395).
67. Id. at 8.
68. Id.
69. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11.
70. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 66, at 15.
71. Id. at 42. See, e.g., Darby v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 74 Fed. App'x. 813 (9th
Cir. 2003).
72. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 66, at 22.
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the CIA that it must comply with substantive law on this issue.73

The respondents relied on the Ninth Circuit distinction between
Totten and Reynolds and concluded that the state secrets privilege
applied, and rejected the Executive Branch's categorical bar. They
argued that the judiciary has absolute authority to determine if a
case can proceed without publicly exposing secrets.
While
acknowledging a role for the Executive, the court "cannot abdicate
[its] responsibility to the Executive."74 To do otherwise, the
respondents argued, "would set a course toward the complete
erosion of Reynolds [sic] and a perilous concentration of power in
the Executive. Such a departure from established law is not
justified by this case."75
Respondents tried to phrase this case as a matter of
constitutional law, not enforcement of a contract. Constitutional
rights guarantee citizens a hearing by an agency to review their
claims for financial compensation (food and shelter), health care,
personal security, and career placement.76 For the Executive
Branch to categorically bar this type of action would violate "the
fundamental precept of the availability of the courts to enforce the
rule of law and ensure procedural fairness when official conduct
deprives citizens of liberty or property."77 Similarly, it could
contravene the principles of democracy for which the U.S.
Supreme Court previously noted "[tihe doctrine of the separation
of powers was adopted by the convention of 1787 not to promote
efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power ."7 So,
although the Executive Branch can invoke the state secrets
privilege, the Judiciary is the only body able to determine if the
case can proceed.79 One case involved a CIA employee who was
terminated after he informed a CIA Security Officer that he was a
homosexual. The employee alleged his substantive constitutional
rights, specifically due process and equal protection, were violated.
The Supreme Court in Webster v. Doe, held that the "District
Court has the latitude to control any discovery process which may
be instituted so as to balance respondent's need for access to proof
which would support a colorable constitutional claim against the
extraordinary needs of the CIA for confidentiality and the
protection of its methods, sources, and mission.""°

73. Brief for the Respondents at 12, Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005)(No. 031395).
74. Id. at 14.
75. Id. at 15.
76. Id. at 16.
77. Id. at 18.
78. Id. at 21 (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926)).
79. Id. at 30.
80. 486 U.S. 592, 604 (1988).
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In sum, the Does asked the Court to reject the Executive
Branch's implication that the judiciary is "institutionally
incapable" of dealing with national security cases."
The
Constitution created three branches of government to protect an
individual's constitutional due process rights. Moreover, Totten is
a limited privilege case, not an authorization to deny subject
matter jurisdiction by the Executive Branch.82 The Ninth Circuit's
holding preserves the CIA's ability to invoke a state secrets
privilege after remand and, if in the interest of national security,
the case will be dismissed. Since there had been no finding that
state secrets would be disclosed, the respondent's argue that the
case should proceed on remand to the District Court.
In their final brief, the CIA addressed the Does' arguments
and highlighted the contradiction: in order to recover any
compensation, the Does must establish they were espionage agents
operating pursuant to their agreement with the CIA; but
acknowledging the very existence of the agreement is prohibited.'
Therefore, whether the respondents presented an estoppel
argument or breach of contract claim, it must fail since "the first
element of promissory estoppel is a clear and unambiguous
promise[.]"' Since successful espionage activities mandate secrecy,
the Does cannot seek a judicial order awarding compensation.'
The Does' due process claim equally fails because it would
enable a court to order the "CIA to adopt and apply fair internal
procedures for resolving compensation grievances by alleged
former spies."' In order to do so, however, as the Ninth Circuit
pointed out, the Does must establish, and the court must find as a
matter of fact, that the Does spied for the United States." This
finding, and the exposure of the supporting facts, is barred by
Totten.
The CIA summed up their position by noting that
regardless of whether Totten [sic] is viewed as a substantive rule
that suits based on secret espionage agreements are necessarily
barred by the very nature of the undertaking, or as a "privilege"
against litigating certain claims, or as a prophylactic rule that
protects state secrets, it clearly operates as a jurisdictional bar to

81. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 73, at 44.

82. Id.
83. Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 1, Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005)(No.
03-1395).
84. Id. at 3. See, e.g., Cyberchron Corp. v. Calldata Sys. Dev., Inc., 47 F.3d
39, 43 (2d Cir. 1995).
85. Reply Brief for Petitioners,supra note 83, at 4.

86. Id.
87. Id. at 5.
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complaints 'where the very subject matter of the action [is] a
contract to perform espionage.0
D. The Supreme Court Speaks
Despite the length and breadth of the briefs, the U.S.
Supreme Court rendered a succinct opinion prohibiting lawsuits
against the government that involve covert espionage agreements.
The Court also took the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to task
noting their opinion was "quite wrong." 9 The Court assessed
whether the CIA violated the Does' procedural and substantive
due process rights by failing to submit their claims through a fair
and internal process."
Notwithstanding the review process used by the CIA, the
Court held firm that the very nature of the suit required its
dismissal. The Does, along with the Court of Appeals, reasoned
that Totten established a contract rule which, while barring breach
of espionage contract claims, did not bar claims based on due
process or estoppel theories." The Court relied on its previous
discussion in Totten, holding that "[Plublic policy forbids the
maintenance of any suit in a court of justice. . ." which will lead to
the disclosure of secrets.92 The Court also noted that Totten stands
for the proposition that "the secrecy which such contracts impose
precludes any action for their enforcement.9 3
The Court picked apart the appellate court's reliance on
Reynolds, which recognized "the privilege against revealing
military secrets."' The Ninth Circuit suggested that Totten was
limited to an evidentiary privilege.99 The Supreme Court corrected
the Ninth Circuit, reaffirming that Totten was indeed a categorical
bar.' The Court referred to its Reynolds opinion which pointedly
cited Totten as a case "where the very subject matter of the action,
a contract to perform espionage, was a matter of state secret....
Accordingly it was "dismissed on the pleadings without ever
reaching the question of evidence, since it was so obvious that the
action should never prevail over the privilege."99
Seeking to make its intentions even clearer, the Supreme
Court also noted that Reynolds "cannot plausibly be read to have
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 14 (citingReynolds, 345 U.S. at 11).
Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. at 11-12.
Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 11-12.
Id. (citing Totten, 92 U.S. at 107 (emphasis added)).
Id. (citing Totten, 92 U.S. at 107 (emphasis added)).
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 4-6.
Doe, 329 F.3d at 1158.
Tenet, 544 U.S. at 11-12.
Id. at 11-13 (citingReynolds, 345 U.S. at 11).
Id. at 12 (citing Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11) (emphasis added).
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replaced the categorical Totten bar with the balancing of the state
secrets evidentiary privilege in the distinct class of cases that
depend upon clandestine spy relationships."99 The coup de grace
was the Court's admonition of the Court of Appeals with its
observation "that if the 'precedent of this Court has direct
application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in
some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the
case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative
of overruling its own decisions."""
Thus, the Court made clear its decision to put this issue to
rest. One may even surmise that the Court was extending a
warning, of sorts, for those who may raise this issue again. The
Court of Appeals' rebuke and succinct opinion belie the Court's
overt displeasure in this case. Simply stated, the Court refused to
let such a case see the proverbial light of day.
"Even a
small chance that some court will order disclosure of a source's
identity could well impair intelligence gathering and cause sources
to 'close up like a clam." 1
E. Are all Spies Alike?
As time has passed, particularly after September 11, 2001,
human intelligence operations have become even more critical as
the United States tries to penetrate terrorist groups, narcotics
trafficking organizations, and rogue nations to gather intelligence
about their criminal intentions. 2 A spy's traditional remedy in the
first instance is to seek compensation from the agency utilizing
their services. The Totten Court recognized this option opining
that spies "must look for their compensation to the contingent
fund of the department employing them, and to such
allowance
0 3°
from it as those who dispense that fund may award."
Most, if not all, investigative, law enforcement, and
intelligence agencies avail themselves of services by informants.
At times referred to as "assets", "spies", or "confidential
informants", they all provide original sensitive information about
some threat to the United States.
Although some collect
intelligence out of a patriotic calling, most do it for reasons such as
monetary rewards, reduction of criminal charges/sentences, or
entry and citizenship into the United States.

99. Id.
100. Id. (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477, 484 (1989)).
101. Id. at 1238 (citing CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 175 (1985)).
102. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 66, at 12 (citing FINAL REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT, at 415 (2004)).
103. Totten, 92 U.S. at 107.
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The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is a federal law
enforcement agency with a substantial intelligence gathering
component that utilizes persons who gather information about
people, organizations, locations (drug labs, cultivation fields, stash
houses), and methods (money laundering, trafficking routes,
concealment techniques). The purpose of the following excerpt" is
to provide a comparison of the regulations and methods of
compensating informants relied on by the DEA versus those at
issue here used by the CIA.
II. DEA's INFORMANT PROGRAM
Today's investigators, particularly those involved in drug
trafficking, rely on confidential sources of information ("CS") to
infiltrate criminal organizations to help build their cases. During
their training as Basic Agent Trainees and throughout their
careers, investigators are repeatedly instructed not to make
promises to CSs. For example, pursuant to Section 6612.57(A)(1)
are specifically
of the DEA Agent's Manual, agents
prohibited from promising informants rewards in any amount."5
This rule is especially important when the issue is a reward for the
information provided to the investigator. DEA Special Agents and
Task Force Officers have utilized thousands of CSs who have been
compensated justly for their efforts. In a limited number of cases,
a CS objects to the amount of a reward she/he received and files a
civil action against the DEA for a breach of contract seeking a
reward of compensatory damages, arguing that she/he was
"promised" and/or is "entitled" to a definitive dollar amount or a
specific percentage of the assets seized. Notwithstanding their
assertions, a CS is not entitled to any amount of a reward nor can
she/he legally rely on any purported promises made by
investigators.
The statutory authority for CS rewards from the Department
of Justice is found in two distinct code sections. The first is 21
U.S.C. § 886, which authorizes the Attorney General to pay any
person from funds appropriated to the Drug Enforcement
Administration for information concerning a violation of the

104. Douglas A. Kash, Rewarding Confidential Informants: Cashing In On
Terrorism and Narcotics Trafficking, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 231, 240-41
(2002).
105. Id. (citing the DEA AGENTS' MANUAL).

Do not make any commitments to a CS regarding payment from [the
Asset Forfeiture Fund]. CSs have no inherent "entitlement" to receive
payment from the Asset Forfeiture Fund regardless of the extent of their
cooperation. The final decision as to whether to pay a CS from the Asset
Forfeiture Fund is at the discretion of the appropriate Headquarters
officials ....

The John Marshall Law Review

[39:475

Controlled Substances Act... without regard to any reward the
person may otherwise receive.
The second source is found at 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1), which
provides that the Assets Forfeiture Fund (AFF) "shall be available
to the Attorney General without fiscal year limitations for
[specified] law enforcement purposes." By its very language,
granting a reward is discretionary and the statute neither
enumerates any specific requirements nor stipulates a certain
sum. Consequently, section 524(c) does not mandate that a CS is
entitled to monetary remuneration. 7 Within section 524(c) there
are two subsections which provide for a reward.
Section 524(c)(1)(B) allows for the payment of rewards for
information or assistance directly relating to violations of the
criminal drug laws. Section 524(c)(1)(C) grants the Attorney
General discretionary authority to pay a reward for information or
assistance leading to a civil or criminal forfeiture. One court
opined that:
When an informant provides information or assistance under section
524(c)(1)(B), the Attorney General or her delegate has discretion to
award any amount between $0.00 and $250,000.00. Similarly, when
an informant provides information or assistance under section
524(c)(1)(C), the Attorney General or her delegate has discretion to
award any amount between $0.00 and $250,000.00, or between zero
and 25 percent of the amount realized from the property forfeited,
whichever is less. Neither section 524(c)(1)(B) nor section
524(c)(1)(C) requires payment of any particular sum; instead, the
statute leaves the amount of the award to the discretion of the
Attorney general or her delegate.'0 8
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
determined that 28 U.S.C. § 524(c) authorizes the discretionary
payment of rewards from the proceeds of forfeited property but
does not mandate the payment of compensation from the
government.o9
The DEA has adopted internal regulations, set forth in the
DEA Agents Manual, which detail the purely discretionary nature
of the payment of rewards and the officials who are required to
approve these rewards at the highest levels of the DEA. Where
the payment of rewards is contingent on the quality of the
information provided, it is not integral to an Agent's duties that he

106. 21 U.S.C. § 886 et seq (2000).
107. Hoch v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 39, 45 (1995). See also, Henke v.
United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 15, 28 (1999) (noting that decisions to make awards
of $250,000 or more under 28 U.S.C. 524(c) are "wholly discretionary").
108. Hoch, 33 Fed. Cl. at 44-45 (internal citations omitted).
109. Id. at 45. See also, Perri v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 627, 630 (1996)
(recognizing that there is no language in 524(a) that affirmatively mandates
an award by the Attorney General).
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be able to contract with informants at the beginning of the
informant relationship, as former CS plaintiffs typically allege.
Agents are specifically prohibited from making promises to a CS,
and conduct which violates that prohibition cannot be said to be
integral to the agents' duties."' Section 6612.57(A)(1) of the DEA
Agents Manual provides that "[t]he final decision as to whether to
pay a CS from the Asset Forfeiture Fund is at the discretion of the
appropriate Headquarters officials and will depend upon" other
priorities. Consequently, DEA Special Agents and deputized Task
Force Officers are reminded continually that they are not to make
any promises or firm commitments to a (potential) CS, thereby
creating the impression that the CS is "entitled" to any
remuneration.
CONCLUSION

All informants who conduct themselves in accordance with
the terms of their agreements with the agency controlling them
may be eligible for some proportionate compensation. The type
and amount of this compensation is governed by the laws and
guidelines which regulate that agency. As discussed supra, the
compensation can be in the form of cash rewards, criminal
adjudication, and even U.S. citizenship.
Paramount in the
relationship is the need for the informants to be made aware that
there are no promises; indeed the agreements they sign are not
contracts enforceable in a court of law. Such agreements only set
forth the terms under which the informant will conduct him or
herself and expectations the agency has in utilizing the informant.
The compensation is made wholly at the discretion of the agency.
For an informant to challenge these principles in an open court
likely would expose national security secrets and similarly
categorized sensitive information to the public domain. It is in
this domain where terrorists, drug traffickers, and other nefarious
persons lie in wait to collect pieces of information regarding
espionage operations and methods, and then use such information
against this nation.
Although we live in a free nation with a judiciary open to the
public, freedom is not free; it exacts a heavy price. It is thanks to
the courage, dedication, and sacrifice of generations of Americans
who served in our armed forces, intelligence services, and law
enforcement agencies that the price is, fortunately, not even
higher. If the security of that freedom mandates a prohibition on a
limited class of lawsuits filed by (former) informants seeking
compensation in a court of law, then that is but a small price to

110. See Cruz-Pagan v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 59, 62 (1996) (displaying
the DEA's internal policy refusing to grant contracting authority to field
agents who are neither special agents nor Country Attaches).
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pay compared to the murder of thousands of Americans by
terrorists who have perverted the very freedoms we seek to protect
and promote.

